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ARTICLE
Tweeting terrorism: Vernacular conceptions of Muslims and 
terror in the wake of the Manchester Bombing on Twitter
Joseph Downing, Sarah Gerwens and Richard Dron
ABSTRACT
Both vernacular security studies and critical terrorism studies (CTS) 
offer constructivist analyses of security couched in understandings of 
security speak. However, neither adequately take account of the 
ways in which social media presents important opportunities for 
greater insight into how terrorism is constructed. This study analyses 
tweets posted after the 2017 Manchester bombing, exploring how 
jihadist terror attacks are constructed on social media. To do this, we 
combine social network analysis, as a sampling method, with dis-
course analysis. The study finds that Twitter provides a platform for 
diverse terrorism discourses to be expressed and contested. This 
indicates a literate lay audience within post-attack narratives, self- 
aware of dominant social constructions of “Muslim terrorism”. 
Indeed, it suggests an audience that, on Twitter, is hardly only 
audience but seeks to speak security itself. Insights are gleaned 
with respect to depicting, defending, and critiquing Muslims, con-
structing what it means to be a terrorist, portrayals of victimhood, 
and how terror events feed into broader critiques of “political cor-
rectness” and “liberal” politics. Therefore, the analysis also provides 
further insights into the portrayal and (self-)positioning of Muslims in 
the wake of a jihadist attack and nuances accounts of Muslims’ 
securitisation qua terror.
KEYWORDS 
Terrorism; security; Twitter; 
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Introduction
On the 22nd of May 2017, a British man, Salman Abedi, detonated a suicide bomb in the 
foyer of the Manchester Arena as people were leaving a concert by pop singer Ariana 
Grande. 23 people died, including the attacker, and 139 were wounded. On May 23rd, ISIS 
claimed responsibility for the bombing (Dearden 2017). It was the deadliest terror attack 
in the UK since the 7/7 bombings in 2005. Like 12 years earlier, the attack was grieved, 
debated, and interpreted in traditional media and, later, by politicians, security services, 
and academics. However, unlike in the aftermath of past violence, the public response to 
the Manchester bombing was not left to politicians, “experts”, and journalists alone. Lay 
users on sites such as Twitter immediately discussed the bombing. They interpreted the 
attack and (de)constructed discursive responses to it, even before security elites had fully 
and publicly processed the event.1 This challenges traditional ways of studying and 
conceptualising the response to terror. It also nuances understandings of supposedly 
passive lay audiences of security.
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We draw on critical terrorism studies (CTS) and vernacular security studies to contri-
bute to ongoing conversations on the role of social media and lay audiences in under-
standing the construction of (in)security. Additionally, the case of the Manchester 
bombing offers important insights into the portrayal of Muslims online in the context of 
jihadist violence. Utilising social network analysis as a sampling method for our discourse 
analysis, we engage a novel combination of methods to explore how understandings of 
terror attacks and their perpetrators are constructed on Twitter. To address this broad 
question, we focus on discourse about “Muslim terrorism” in the aftermath of the 
Manchester bombing.
Constructions identified within this study are multifaceted and dynamic; they demon-
strate that social media is one crucial context to study in order to understand how security 
speak is conceived of and contested. Insights are gleaned with respect to what it means to 
be a terrorist, portrayals of victimhood, and how terror events feed into broader critiques 
of immigration and “political correctness”. The discourses analysed also challenge 
straightforward accounts of Muslims’ securitisation in the wake of jihadist violence; 
besides the continued “suspectisation” of Muslims, users banalise them, defend them 
and their faith, anticipate and respond to Islamophobic discourses, and question the 
relationship between religion and terrorism more broadly. Twitter also provides 
a platform for users to speak as Muslims and denounce terrorism. However, the link 
between Muslims, Islam, and terrorism is both implicitly and explicitly reified across these 
discourses.
Conceptualising terror online: vernacular security and critical terrorism 
studies
Recent work in CTS, vernacular security studies, and security studies more broadly has 
begun to engage with social media. Yet, much of the current scholarship on terrorism 
online focuses on the “hard” aspects of the internet as a sphere for extremism and dissent 
(Aly et al. 2016; Rudner 2017). Critical and constructivist work provides a more nuanced 
picture. Recent studies have highlighted how social media can contribute to a sense of 
“togetherness” in the wake of terrorist violence (Merrill et al. 2020), provide a place for 
memes in resistance to threats (Downing 2020), and host discussions about the motiva-
tions of foreign fighters (Da Silva and Crilley 2017), among others. These studies illustrate 
how social media plays a role in documenting and discussing material, emotional, and 
socio-political responses to terrorism. More broadly, they underline the richness of online 
lay discourses and the continued need to expand their study (see Bogain 2020).
We argue that more attention should be paid to the immediate aftermath of a terrorist 
attack when elite statements are still scarce and coverage in print media is just emerging. 
While social media use in the aftermath of an attack has attracted attention in work on 
trauma, communications, social networks, and crisis management (inter alia Kessling et al. 
2020; Eriksson 2016, 2018; Fischer-Preßler, Schwemmer, and Fischbach 2019; Steensen 
2018), critical security studies have catching up to do in this regard. Twitter, with its 
plethora of real-time commentary and high user engagement after a terrorist event 
(Kessling et al. 2020; Steensen 2018), emerges as the most fitting platform to explore 
this. Eriksson (2016), in her work on terrorism and trauma, has also found it to be a place 
for “backchannel communication” that circumvents and criticises mass media discourses 
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in the wake of terrorist violence (building on McNely 2009). This demands further atten-
tion from a critical and vernacular lens. Drawing on social network analysis to sample our 
tweets, we also leverage the networked nature of Twitter discourses, something that so 
far has received little attention in the critical security studies literature.
Critical terrorism studies
CTS seeks to understand the construction of terrorism and its embeddedness in everyday 
life (Erickson 2008; Holland 2011; Veloso and Bateman 2013). They have emerged out of 
a critique of the empirical, conceptual, and ontological weaknesses of conventional 
terrorism studies (Jackson 2007; Gunning 2007; Jarvis 2009; Breen Smyth et al. 2008), 
particularly their focus on “problem solving” (Jackson 2007; Gunning 2007). CTS adopts 
a constructivist stance vis-à-vis terror events (Jackson 2007; Gunning 2007; Jarvis 2009) 
and foregrounds that constructions are embedded in political and ideological debates 
(Burnett and Whyte 2005). This enables analysis of terrorism beyond its material realities 
situating terrorism as socially constructed.
Vernacular security: from audience to agents
Similarly constructivist, vernacular security studies conceptualises ways security is con-
structed in everyday terms and responds to the lack of understanding of how laypeople 
make sense of (in)security, including terrorism (Bubandt 2005; Jarvis and Lister 2013; 
Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2015; Jackson and Hall 2016). It has sought to challenge 
and complement elite-centric understandings of security and instead prioritises the 
stories of those marginalised in accounts of global politics. Coming without set concep-
tions of what security is or indeed should be provides vernacular security studies with 
a theoretical “emptiness” that enables inductive insights into public understanding of, as 
well as anxiety about, security (Jarvis 2019). This also allows for linking it with related 
literatures, such as CTS, and new contexts, such as Twitter.
Studies of the vernacular have largely been limited to focus groups and methodologies 
with explicitly identified research subjects who are addressed and speak as such (Jarvis 
and Lister 2013, 2016; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2015; Jackson and Hall 2016). While 
these methods offer rich opportunities for sustained exchange, Jarvis (2019) notes that 
these methodologies risk a degree of artificiality and rely on participants’ willingness to 
contribute. While he does not suggest social media as an alternate avenue for researchers, 
others have identified online platforms to address these concerns and provide a novel 
view on the vernacular (Bogain 2020; Da Silva and Crilley 2017). This is not to say that 
social media data is without its own limitations or that one method is more “truthful” than 
the other, but that online sources can offer a less contrived view into everyday discourses 
than traditional research settings. Going beyond the unidirectional media, culture, policy, 
and “expert” outputs long analysed in CTS literature (inter alia Sorenson 2009; Hülsse and 
Spencer 2008; Jackson 2005; Stampnitzky 2013), this invites novel approaches and 
insights.
Such elites and expert outputs are featured prominently in security studies more 
broadly. Meanwhile, their lay audience is often assumed to be passive (Pears 2016, 80) 
and, besides vernacular work, constructivist approaches such as CTS have largely failed to 
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 3
account for the role of laypeople beyond being “the audience”. The terms of security, 
thus, are understood to be constructed and contestable, yet constructed and contestable 
mostly by those who are also assumed to have written them. Homolar and Rodríguez- 
Merino (2019), for example, note that audience comprehension of a violent event 
depends on its discursive presentation; but their analysis suggests the locus of such 
presentation at the level of “political agents”. Elites speak security, laypeople listen – 
a setup also found in the foundational writings of the Copenhagen School (inter alia 
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1997; Wæver 1995).2 Excluding the vernacular turn, 
a “‘methodological elitism”’ (Stanley and Jackson 2016) has characterised much security 
and terrorism research. Approaching social media from a vernacular security perspective 
serves to ameliorate this elitism; there, commenting on terrorism is open to all users. 
Ordinary posters can become dominant actors (Klinger and Svensson 2015), especially 
during a crisis (Meraz and Papacharissi 2013).
Of course, social media is not an elite- nor expert-free space. Many political commen-
tators, journalists, and academics are popular on Twitter. In the UK, Twitter users in 
managerial, administrative, and professional occupations are overrepresented compared 
to the British population (Sloan 2017). Yet, #BlackTwitter (Graham and Smith 2016) and 
campaigns such as #BlackLivesMatter (Nummi, Jennings, and Feagin 2019) and 
#IamaRefugee (Estrada, Anderson, and Brown 2021), among many others, have illustrated 
how the site also allows for bottom-up political contestation and provides a space for 
marginalised voices. Like Bogain’s (2020) analysis of comments on online news articles, 
“the findings of this article are not intended to offer an exact reflection of public opinion 
as a whole, but they do provide an important insight into the way security is conceptua-
lised by ordinary citizens online” (597). “Ordinary”, in our reading, is therefore better 
conceptualised as “lay”, referencing those not engaged in the elite production of security, 
such as researchers, policymakers, journalists, and terrorism experts.
Security and the construction of (British) Muslims3
The Manchester bombing provoked a range of responses, in media, politics, and online as 
well as offline (Zhao and Zhan 2019). Given its association with jihadist terrorism, the 
attack particularly implicated (British) Muslims: in the following month, anti-Muslim hate 
crimes in Manchester increased by 500% compared to the previous year (Halliday 2017) 
and anti-immigrant as well as anti-refugee sentiments intensified (Mancosu, Cappiali, and 
Pereira 2018). Generally, anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crimes have been found to 
increase in the wake of terror attacks (Awan and Zempi 2016; Hanes and Machin 2014).
On social media, the most “liked” messages in response to the Manchester bombing 
were more ambivalent; they contain emotive and human-interest content both positive 
and negative in nature (Zhao and Zhan 2019). Generally, information-sharing and positive 
content is more popular on Twitter in the aftermath of a terror attack than negative posts 
(Burnap et al. 2014; Fischer-Preßler, Schwemmer, and Fischbach 2019). We should, con-
sequently, expect to find mostly positive discourses in our dataset. Meanwhile, estab-
lished scholarship on Islamophobia online and securitisation in the context of terrorism 
more broadly, as summarised below, would suggest much more negative posts. These 
contradictory findings necessitate further analysis of vernacular post-attack discourses on 
social media.
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There are numerous ways in which the category of “Muslim” has been deployed in the 
context of security and terrorism discussions. In the UK, the label increasingly took on 
salience after the Iranian revolution and Satanic verses episode (Modood 2006), when both 
Islam and Muslims became situated as existential threats to the liberal political and social 
order of the country (Jackson 2005), something that has accelerated post-9/11 in Europe 
and beyond (Cesari 2009). Muslims and Islam are othered in counter-terrorism and counter- 
radicalisation discourses (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Fekete 2009; Awan 2012), with 
Islamophobia becoming increasingly institutionalised in response to “Islamist” terror (Gilks 
2020). These discourses, in turn, build on larger and historical frames of Orientalism and 
racism (Amin-Khan 2012). These portrayals strip Muslims of their agency; they are reported 
on, written about, yet rarely given a voice (S. Ahmed 2009). Employing a vernacular lens and 
turning to social media can ameliorate some of this exclusion, since, there, marginalised 
groups can oppose mainstream media portrayals (Sobande, Fearfull, and Brownlie 2019).
Conversely, the internet is also a site of sustained Islamophobia (Ekman 2015; Sian 
2018; Awan 2016) and scholars have argued that online platforms can amplify anti-Muslim 
discourses found in traditional media (Törnberg and Petter 2016). In their analysis of 
10,000 tweets mentioning #jihad, Aguilera-Carnerero and Azeez (2016), for example, 
found that users othered Muslims, considered Islam as oppositional to the West, and 
that discussion was led by Islamophobic voices rather than Muslims themselves. These 
discourses are not “merely” virtual, however, with research indicating that internet hate 
can manifest as offline violence (Williams et al. 2020) and that online and analogue 
victimisation are linked (Awan and Zempi 2016).
Yet, offline media, especially print, have been the primary avenue through which to 
understand dominant discursive constructions of Muslims from a security lens (for the UK 
see e.g. Moore, Mason, and Lewis 2008; Nickels et al. 2012; Saeed 2007). The increasing 
penetration of social media into everyday use to read about and comment on news, but 
also as a source of data used by “conventional” news sources themselves, necessitates 
greater consideration of discourses produced about Muslims online.
Analytical and methodological approaches to understanding the 
Manchester bombing on Twitter
Analysing social media in relation to security events requires a multi-layered methodolo-
gical approach. The first challenge is defining and collecting a robust dataset. Once the 
data is collected, it needs to be mapped into a social network graph to understand 
connections between users and the influence of posts. Lastly, one can analyse the 
discourses shared in the most influential tweets.
Twitter data collection
Social media research, like all research, entails unique opportunities as well as limitations. 
On Twitter, these mainly concern delineation of the sample, data access, and representa-
tiveness. However, while these challenges need to be acknowledged, they do not fore-
close studies in this burgeoning area of security studies. The data examined in this article 
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is part of a larger dataset focussed on the Manchester bombing. The slice of the dataset 
used contains a concurrent 27,367 tweets posted between 22:31 on 22 May 2017, when 
the bombing occurred, and 09:59 on 23 May 2017.
The tweets were obtained through the now decommissioned Texifter service and 
identified using keywords. Through the service, keywords and timeframe need to be 
stipulated to determine the tweets one retrieves. Since an exploratory examination of 
Twitter searching for “Manchester” at the time of the bombing drew in too many irrelevant 
posts but revealed that a focus of the post-attack discussions were “Muslims”, we combined 
the keywords “Manchester” and “Muslims” to retrieve our dataset.4 This situates the study 
within important discussions regarding how Muslims and Islam are enmeshed in security 
discourses. However, while our choice of keywords builds on the literature’s interest in 
Muslims as focal points of discourses on terrorism and enabled us to get a more focussed 
dataset, it limits the study to post-attack discussions that mention Muslims and that do so 
explicitly. With greater financial and human resources, an analysis of the wider post-attack 
discourse could have been conducted. This is an important avenue for future research.
A likely more significant gap in our data is content removed by Twitter itself, because of 
its policies of deleting tweets considered hate speech and suspending or deleting offend-
ing accounts. The site’s guidelines “prohibit targeting individuals with content intended to 
incite fear or spread fearful stereotypes about a protected category . . . e.g., ‘all [religious 
group] are terrorists.’” (Twitter n. d.). While many tweets in our dataset fit this description 
and continue to be online, we assume that an unknown proportion of particularly explicit 
and hateful posts might have been removed before we could retrieve them.
Furthermore, it is important to note that social media users are not a homogenous 
group nor representative of the general population, particularly those users who partici-
pate in political discussions (Barberá and Rivero 2014; Mellon and Prosser 2017). In the 
USA, for example, Twitter users have also been found to be younger, richer and more left/ 
liberal politically than the general population, and more likely to express pro-immigration 
views (Wojcik and Hughes 2019). As noted earlier, anecdotal observations suggest that 
journalists and political elites might also be overrepresented on the site. Furthermore, our 
insights are not blindly generalisable to social media per se. We study Twitter as an 
example of social media and discourse online, not a synonym for it. Further research 
should explore the (re)conceptualisations of terrorist violence on other sites within a CTS 
and vernacular security frame, opening the door for cross-site comparisons.
Nonetheless, even with these limitations in mind, the interactive nature of social media 
and Twitter in particular opens up rich avenues for the analysis of how discursive 
responses to terrorism are subject to bottom-up contestation and reconstruction. Both 
in their immediacy, where users can turn to Twitter before the material realities of a terror 
attack have been officially confirmed, and their multivocality, tweets highlight how 
terrorism is socially constructed not only by security elites and agents of terror, but by 
everyday individuals. This renders them a crucial context of investigation.
Social network analysis as a sampling method for large Twitter data sets
Social media presents researchers with a near overwhelming amount of data, even more 
so if one seeks to do qualitative analysis “by hand”. Twitter is no exception. One might 
manage this wealth of text by randomly sampling tweets or narrowing down the 
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sampling frame, but these approaches ignore a key feature of social media posts: their 
influence. Therefore, they fail to account for one of the central elements that makes these 
data both different and analytically rich. Mindful of these shortcomings, we leverage 
social network analysis (SNA) to generate a sample of the most influential tweets, under-
line the role of lay actors online, and understand the connections between them.
SNA uses a mathematical calculation to quantify influence with all actors within 
a network. To do this, the dataset was imported into the network analysis and visualisa-
tion software Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy 2009), which was used to generate 
a social network graph used here that demonstrates: 
● How individuals share messages.
● How their behaviour forms clusters.
● The relationships between clusters of different messages. 
Gephi enables the rendering of large datasets into “sociograms”. Within these graphi-
cal representations, individuals are represented by points (nodes), and their interactions 
with each other by lines (edges). Thus, SNA examines structural relationships between 
socially connected actors (Davies 2009) and offers insights into social media behaviour 
including establishing patterns of situational awareness, alongside the salience of parti-
cular messages (W. Ahmed and Lugovic 2019). With this in mind, it is possible to examine 
conversations on Twitter not just in terms of their content, but in their patterns of 
information flow (Himelboim et al. 2017). SNA enables us to map the various constituents 
of this network space and their relations to each other (Smith et al. 2014).
This relational approach enables researchers to identify influence within a network, 
including the most frequently interacted with posts. It can do this through a measure 
called betweenness centrality which determines how connected an individual is to the 
rest of the network. In broad terms, the more connected an individual is, the more 
engagement their messages are receiving and thus the more influential they are. 
Graphically, betweenness centrality is a measure of centrality based on shortest paths. 
Within outputted sociograms, with every pair of vertices in a connected graph, there will 
always be at least one shortest path and the betweenness centrality for each vertex is the 
number of these shortest paths. This means that in terms of network theory, a node with 
higher betweenness centrality would, in effect, naturally have more control over the 
network, because more information will always pass through that node. As such, nodes 
with the highest betweenness centrality demonstrate the capacity to influence through 
these messages. This is an important and undervalued aspect of SNA that can be applied 
to studies even when the aim of the study is not to interrogate the networks themselves. 
We used betweenness centrality to rank the tweets by influence and identify the top 10% 
most influential tweets, reducing the initial sample of 27,367 posts to 2,736.
In Figure 1, one can see the disparity of influence by tweet and actor; a few actors, 
identifiable by their different colours, are connected to a much larger number of actors by 
edges within the graph demonstrating connectedness and engagement in the forms of 
retweets and replies. In the appendix, the individual four network graphs are shown, 
extracted in their entirety from Figure 1. Notably, none of the central actors are members 
of security elites; rather, they are football and pop star fan accounts, as well as “regular”, 
non-expert social media users.
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It is important to note that influence and engagement do not equal agreement with 
a message; actually, they can mean the opposite, as engagements with tweets that make 
them “influential” through betweenness centrality can be antagonistic. For example, the most 
influential user within the entire network, a young, white, British woman with fewer than 500 
followers, posted an initial message that sought to banalise Muslims, as displayed in Figure 2.
Although this positive message has been shared widely, many connected users 
respond to it negatively, specifically in relation to Islam and terrorism:
This example demonstrates the importance, methodologically and conceptually, of not 
conflating influence on social media with agreement or endorsement. It underlines how 
social media is a space where dominant discourses are de-constructed and challenged 
alongside their reification, and, methodologically, highlights the need to combine SNA 
with an analysis of posts’ content.
Discourse analysis of the sampled tweets
Discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary methodology (Brown and George 1983) seeking to 
understand how language enacts social and cultural perspectives and identities (Gee 2004). 
Within this, critical discourse analysis (CDA) seeks to bring power relations and ideology 
into the analysis to examine how these are established and re-produced through language 
(Fairclough 2013). Following Amin-Khan’s (2012) critique that security studies and research 
Figure 1. Visualisation of complete network structure containing 22,004 nodes (actors in the con-
versation) and 22,579 edges (conversational strands within the network).
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on Muslim securitisation need to take power and socio-political contexts into account, such 
attention to the social dimension of language renders CDA a fitting methodology for 
understanding constructions of jihadist terror and its perpetrators online.
Regardless of theoretical underpinnings, discourse analysis requires operationalisation 
in how it is robustly and systemically applied to any given dataset. This study chooses to 
operationalise discourse analysis via critical reflexive thematic analysis, using a 6-step 
coding process described by Braun and Clarke (2006):
(1) Familiarisation with data.
(2) Generating initial codes.
(3) Searching for themes among codes.
(4) Reviewing themes.
(5) Designing and naming themes.
(6) Producing the final report.
The umbrella of discourse analysis is wide, and, in our view, risks being methodologically 
fuzzy; since reflexive thematic analysis overlaps significantly with constructionist, pattern- 
based discourse analysis (Braun and Clarke 2021), we borrow the analytical strategy of the 
former to concretise the implementation of the latter.
Figure 2. Content shared by a central user.
Figure 3. Critical responses to the tweet in .Figure 2.
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Once betweenness centrality had been used as a metric of influence to generate the set 
of tweets to be analysed, unreadable, non-English language tweets, and those which could 
not be clarified because linked media or tweets were unavailable were removed, leaving 
2,677 posts for coding. The data was sorted and coded in Excel, with the unit of analysis 
being an individual tweet. When relevant, posts were assigned to more than one theme. 
Retweets are included in the sample as they indicate both message saliency and reception.
The audience speaks back: (De-) constructing “Muslim” terrorism on Twitter
The tweets analysed engage with a variety of discourses; they reflect on the role of 
religion in general and Islam in particular, they assign blame, they discuss the figures of 
the terrorist and his victims and consider the appropriate response to such violence. In 
other words, they provide the insights into “the specific language and text produced by 
lay members of the public about the subject of ‘terrorism’ in terms of its specific nature, 
causes, and solutions” that Jackson and Hall (2016, 3) have called for. Taken together, 
these categories shed light on how terrorism is constructed in the wake of an attack and 
emphasise the active role lay individuals play in the construction and contestation of 
security speak. Indeed, there are no significant security elite voices, such as national 
politicians or security experts, in the sample.
What is notable are the high proportion of tweets in defence of Muslims and Islam 
and the range of discourses on interpretations of the incident. While there is no 
discussion on whether the attack can be understood as terrorism – this descriptor is 
adopted across the data, users differ in their response to it. They are aware of both 
the supposedly pro- and anti-Muslim/Islam narratives emerging in the aftermath of 
jihadist terrorism and actively respond to them. Twitter functions as a site of meta- 
discourse and, following Eriksson (2016), backchannel discourse on how to respond 
to and interpret terrorist violence. Like other studies have indicated, positive mes-
sages, meaning those defending Muslims, were prominent, but over 10% also shared 
negative, Islamophobic sentiments, and we argue that even the “Islamophilic” posts 
reify the link between Muslims and terrorism. It is essential to take such (meta-) 
discourses into account, since they indicate that users are not only aware of the 
dominant narratives produced in the wake of an attack, but that they also shape and 
challenge them.
The data was divided into eight main themes (Table 1), including an “Other” category 
that is not analysed here, and covers neutral posts, news, and tweets that did not fit within 
the other themes:
Defence of Muslims/Islam
A majority of the tweets are not concerned with the material realities of the attack per se, 
but the response to it; they reference perceived or predicted anti-Muslim and anti-Islam 
narratives emerging in the wake of the incident. Some directly respond to Islamophobic 
tweets, while others refer to Islamophobia more broadly (see Figure 4). They function as 
active “backchannels” to discourses that blame Muslims and Islam at large for terrorism 
(Eriksson 2016). To do this, users banalise Muslims, evoke a good/bad Muslim dichotomy, 
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or construct Islam as a positive, peaceful faith and render terrorists inherently un-Islamic. 
However, close analysis indicates that even the defence of Muslims and Islam risks reifying 
their discursive link to terrorism.
In high prevalence across the data, Muslims are banalised (Downing 2019); they 
become “taxi drivers offering free lifts”, “Muslim doctors”, fellow Mancunians, or young 
concert attendees instead of terrorists. The incomprehensibility and violence of the attack 
is juxtaposed with the commonplaceness of Muslims. Furthermore, their portrayal 
Table 1. Summary of themes by percentage occurrence in the dataset.
Theme Description Percentage
Defence of Muslims/Islam Critical of blame being placed on Muslims or Islam, 
concerned about Islamophobia in the wake of the 
attack
58%
Terrorism has no religion Expressed that terrorism has no religion 24%
Terrorists Referenced characteristics of terrorists 11%
Critique of Muslims/Islam Criticised Muslims and/or Islam, blamed terrorism on Islam 11%
Muslims’ response to the attack 10%
Muslim condemnation (Reports of or calls for) Muslims condemning and grieving 
the attack
8%
Muslim celebration Reports of Muslims celebrating the attack 2%
Critique of the “liberal” response Criticised “politically correct” response as concerned about 
Muslims rather than the attack’s victims
6%
Victims Referenced those hurt or killed by terrorism 6%
Other Neutral tweets; posts that do not fall within the other 
categories
6%
Figure 4. Tweets defending and banalising Muslims by a football fan account.
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highlights not only their ordinariness, but also their helpfulness in the wake of the attack. 
In some tweets, Muslims do not only belong to the Manchester community, but con-
tribute to it. The salient part of their identification is meant to be their jobs or their 
Manchester residence rather than their religion (also see Downing 2019).
In other tweets, Muslims and Islam are defended from a religious vantage point; their 
faith is described as a faith of peace, and violence is understood as antithetical to it. Rather 
than banal, Muslims become innocent. Following this discourse, some users want to 
“remind” others that it was not a Muslim who did the bombing; that it simply could not 
have been one, since the brutality of the act renders it inherently non-Islamic. Muslims, 
therefore, cannot be blamed, since the attack was committed by a “monster” not 
a Muslim. Instead of the good/bad Muslim dichotomy, bad Muslims are no longer 
Muslims at all. Rather than a suspect community (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Breen- 
Smyth 2014; Awan 2012), Muslims in their plurality are imagined as an innocent one. 
Neutrality, however, is foreclosed.
Other users draw on exactly this good/bad Muslim dichotomy (Mamdani 2002; Maira 
2009) to reinforce it, rescuing the majority of Muslims from the charge of terrorism by 
blaming a few “extremists” that take the scripture too far or misinterpret it. Not “all 
Muslims”, this line of argument goes, are terrorists. A wholesale condemnation of the 
community is dismissed. Nonetheless, the notion of Muslims as potentially suspect and 
dangerous is implicitly maintained.
Across the variations of the defence discourse, the imperative of “don’t blame 
Muslims”, a phrase popular in the data, anticipates an audience to be addressed; at 
times, these are specific users as indicated by the @ function or retweets, but often the 
audience is Twitter and society at large. The users exhibit familiarity with the anti-Muslim 
discourses expressed in discussions about terrorism and the increase of Islamophobia and 
hate crimes in the wake of terror attacks (Halliday 2017; Awan and Zempi 2017; Hanes and 
Machin 2014). Manchester becomes embedded in a series of terror-Islamophobia cycles 
that the users want to break. This is particularly notable since it adds nuance to the picture 
painted by previous studies that have focused on online Islamophobia (inter alia Awan 
2016; Aguilera-Carnerero and Azeez 2016; Horsti 2017).
Terrorism has no religion
The second most common theme within the tweets is the declaration, often verba-
tim, that “terrorism has no religion” (see Figure 5). This allows us to analyse not only 
users’ understanding of terrorism, but of “religious terrorism” in particular. The 
discourse can be read from two angles, as outlined below, one that seeks to 
construct terrorism as a-religious while the other portrays it as pan-religious. 
Neither approach, however, fully discounts religion as a valid lens through which 
to interpret terrorism, even if it is as its antithesis.
The “no religion” argument often overlaps with a defence of Muslims or Islam, and it is 
never brought forward by those blaming Muslims for the attack. In many tweets, it is an 
extension of the more specific “the terrorists cannot have been Muslim because Muslims 
would not do something like this” reasoning. The act was not only un-Islamic, but 
irreligious, users argue. This entails that to maintain the dichotomy between religion 
and terrorism, terrorists are denied their faith. There are some “moderate” or “good” 
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Muslims who can speak and stand for Islam; but jihadist terrorists with their explicit 
invocation of the faith cannot. This underlines the different ways ”Muslim” can be taken 
up as a self-descriptor (Adamson 2011) and raises questions about agency and authority 
regarding who and what gets to be Muslim in the context of (the war on) global jihadist 
terror that are beyond the scope of this article.
Markedly, “religious terrorism” is not called into question due to the ambiguities 
that separate it from so-called “secular terrorism” (cf. Gunning and Jackson 2011); the 
“no religion” discourse is not based on material or empirical concerns about what 
constitutes terrorism, but interpretations of what constitutes “religious”. This defence 
of faith exceeds a narrow desecuritisation of Islam, it makes a normative claim about 
religion as a whole, as inherently non-violent and opposed to terror. However, this 
discourse is also highly contested, with unique tweets as well as retweets and 
responses emphasising the role of Islam in the Manchester attack and terrorism in 
general, as outlined below.
Other claims about the irreligiosity of terrorism appear more concerned with its pan- 
religiosity, referencing that both perpetrators and victims of it are not limited to one 
creed. While terrorism becomes an absolute evil external to faith(s) in the first iteration 
of the “no religion” discourse, terrorism is a danger possibly inherent to all belief 
systems in the second one. It is constructed as the problem of “extremists” and 
“radicals” within a religion. Islam, then, implicitly and at times explicitly appears parti-
cularly vulnerable to such extreme readings and the good Muslim/bad Muslim dichot-
omy is reified. However, the overarching drive of “terrorism has no religion” is to bring 
together rather than divide.
Notably, whilst users emphasise that terrorism has no religion, the response to it 
apparently does: the hashtag #prayforManchester is used in 17% of all analysed 
tweets, often alongside the “terrorism has no religion” claim. This call to prayer 
appears to be used by Muslims as well as Christians and, presumably, other faiths 
represented in the data. Echoing similar sentiments expressed on Twitter after other 
recent terror attacks in Europe (Eriksson Krutrök and Lindgren 2018), prayer functions 
as a signal to indicate both grief, solace, and solidarity. Its hashtagged nature further 
highlights the call’s function to unite the users and constructs prayer as a shared, 
Figure 5. One of the most popular tweets in the sample, posted by a music fan account.
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universal response to the incident. In paradoxical tandem with the argument that 
terrorism has no religion, #prayforManchester helps to disassociate religion from the 
violence of the terror attack and locates it on the side of the victims and the grieving 
public instead.
Constructing terrorists
11% of the tweets provide insight into who terrorists are constructed to be, with nearly all 
emphasising their exceptionalism. Echoing Roach, Cartwright, and Pease (2020) findings, 
people also generally express anger at the perpetrator. Markedly, none of the users 
mention Salman Abedi, whose identity was leaked shortly after the bombing, by name. 
Instead, users draw on broader tropes about Muslim terrorists and appear to make a point 
about terrorism and, some, “Muslim terrorism” more generally instead. This highlights 
how individual terror events are embedded in larger (in)security discourses, on which 
users draw, as well as how they contribute to these. Others have noted that such 
communitarisation of terrorist violence, shifting away from its individual perpetrators, is 
also more common in the reception of attacks like the Manchester bombing: while white 
and right-wing perpetrators are “lone wolfs”, jihadist terrorists stand in for their faith 
community (Breen-Smyth 2020).
In many of the tweets and at times overlapping with the “Don’t blame Muslims” 
discourse, someone who commits a terrorist attack is an “extremist”, rather than a “real”, 
regular Muslim. While, according to some tweets, such “radicals” also exist in other 
faiths, this discourse echoes policy and academic concerns about the relationship 
between radicalisation, terrorism, and Islam (e.g. Ranstorp 2010; critical e.g. Heath- 
Kelly 2013). Terrorism is constructed as the extreme and the terrorist as far removed 
from the mainstream, as “sick” or “insane”. According to Crenshaw (2014), coverage of 
domestic terrorism emphasises perpetrators’ pathological and personal abnormality, 
while foreign attackers are portrayed as transnational threats with little personal 
context.5 Tweets in the dataset mostly fall into the latter category, but with a third 
narrative, that of foreignness qua religious radicalism, predominating. While not men-
tioned in the data, Abedi’s own status as a British citizen further complicates the 
domestic-foreign distinction proposed by Crenshaw (2014). Instead, it points to the 
subjective and constructivist nature of the discourse. “Muslim terrorists”, thus, are 
othered and rendered extreme through their religion, even if due to their extremism 
they fall outside the boundaries of “real” Muslim identity. Independent of their citizen-
ship status, their extremism is Islamic and, therefore, implicitly foreign. Personal or 
secular motivations, meanwhile, are not considered in the tweets (also see Gunning 
and Jackson 2011). Neither do users draw on the “terrorists as vulnerable or brain-
washed victims” narrative featured prominently in Jackson and Hall’s (2016) focus 
groups.
Beyond being portrayed as extreme, the language used to refer to terrorists indicates 
a degree of depersonalisation. Users write of “monsters”, “barbaric animals” and 
“DEMONS”. Many express their disbelief about how someone could commit such 
a violent act. These terrorist monsters also stand in implicit juxtaposition to Muslims as 
a banal community, they “help to reinforce boundaries between self and other, civilisation 
and barbarism, good and evil” (Devetak 2005, 642; also see Rai 2004). Terrorists are the 
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incomprehensible and abject other; to religion and Islam, as in the “Don’t blame Muslims” 
and “terrorism has no religion” discourses, but also vis-à-vis society at large. As indicated 
elsewhere in CTS and securitisation literature, such othering of terrorists can have severe 
policy consequences, including justifying extra-legal measures in the name of counter-
terrorism (Jackson 2005).
Criticising Muslims/Islam
11% of tweets in the sample are critical of Muslims and/or Islam, with many assigning 
blame for the attack to the Muslim community or Islamic faith as a whole. Drawing on 
broader Islamophobic and xenophobic narratives, the tweets provide insight into the 
construction of “Muslim” violence and its supposed perpetrators. Indeed, users present an 
inverse of the “no religion” argument – they argue that exactly Islam as a religo-cultural 
Other is to blame for the violence. Albeit making up a comparatively small part of the 
sample, these posts represent an important discourse that other users are both anticipat-
ing and directly responding to, as outlined previously. Furthermore, the relative lack of 
anti-Muslim sentiments in our dataset might be read more as an illustration of Twitter’s 
liberal and pro-immigration user base (Wojcik and Hughes 2019), as well as evidence of 
the deletion of xenophobic and Islamophobic posts than sign of the infrequency of post- 
attack Islamophobia in general.
Many users characterise terror as inherent to Islam, and Muslims as suspect outsiders. 
Some differentiate between the “radicals” described previously, the “religious Muslims 
with long hair [who] support Jihad” and non-terrorist Muslims but still maintain that 
a susceptibility to violence is inherent to the faith. Several refer to Islam as a violent or 
sexist religion, echoing longstanding Orientalist tropes (Said [1978] 1979). While some 
tweets express their anger at “fucking Muslims” as a whole, others highlight that while not 
all Muslims are terrorists, (nearly) all terrorists are Muslim. This suggests that non-Muslim 
violence may not be interpreted through a terrorism framework. Terrorism, understood as 
something extreme and incomprehensibly violent – extreme and incomprehensible to 
a white, Christian, Western sensibility, that is – becomes the perpetual problem of the 
Other.
Additionally, some posts evoke a terrorism-Muslims-migration nexus and securitise 
migration qua terrorism (Nail 2016), stating, for example, that “[t]his is the result of mass 
Muslim immigration. THIS MUST STOP!” Tweets like this highlight how post-attack dis-
courses transcend a focus on terrorism and engage with other salient issues and policy 
demands, in this case, border control and restrictive migration regimes. They indicate 
a partial convergence of the figure of the ‘“Muslim immigrant” and that of the terrorist, 
portraying those who allowed Muslim immigration as complicit in the bombing. This 
serves to illustrate Mancosu et al.’s (2018) finding that the attack intensified anti- 
immigrant sentiments. However, amalgamations of terror, Islam, and migration are hardly 
new nor limited to the Manchester bombing. Bogain (2020), for example, found similar 
narratives in his analysis of online comments on articles about the French state of 
emergency.
Other posts link to “Muslim terrorism” more generally and reference non-UK contexts, 
such as the “travel ban” instated in the US the same year or the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. 
Notably, more than half of the tweets in this theme were posted by users listing an 
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identifiable non-UK location. The event, therefore, is understood beyond its national 
context and Islam is constructed not as a local foe, but a global one – echoing a clash 
of civilisations logic. “Manchester” changes from a specific locality or event into shorthand 
for “what happens” when Muslims “buy into the ideology they profess to believe [in]”. This 
transnational dimension of the discourse underlines how studying cyberspace might 
allow researchers to transcend methodological nationalism in security studies and raises 
new questions for both vernacular security studies and CTS in terms of the construction of 
an attack in a particular national locale that becomes embedded into a larger interna-
tional public sphere. However, given that the project focuses on tweets in English and 
that many users turn off geo-localisation, a more in-depth analysis of the location of 
individual messages is not possible and beyond the scope of this project, presenting 
a task for future research.
Across the tweets, Muslims and Islam are essentialised and, if at all, differ mostly in their 
degree of radicalism (see Semati 2011 on the essentialisation of Muslims). This homo-
genisation can be read as the counterpart to efforts at individualising Muslims in other 
themes. While “Muslim defence” tweets banalise Muslims as individuals in the midst of 
Manchester’s community, the “blame Muslims” discourse securitises them as a collective 
external to (British/Western) society.
Muslim response
10% of the posts are concerned with Muslims’ response to the attack (see Figure 6). The 
vast majority of them are messages by self-identified Muslims themselves that condemn 
and grieve the violence. However, a smaller proportion of the content, about 2%, are 
posts sharing reports of Muslims allegedly celebrating the incident. The tweets illustrate 
the importance and self-aware performance of “correct” responses to terrorist violence 
that adheres to collective “feeling rules” (Eroukhmanoff 2019a) – failure to comply 
provokes outrage and proves Muslim complicity.
Both discourses concerned with Muslims’ response to the attack assume that they are 
supposed to respond. A few tweets even call on them to do so, with one asking “[I] [w]onder 
if Muslims in Manchester & everywhere will trend #MuslimsDenounceJihad.” They remain 
potentially suspect unless they actively declare their opposition to violence. Neutrality, 
meanwhile, is foreclosed. In its denial qua condemnation as well as when it is “proven” in 
the Muslim celebration discourse, the association between terrorism and Islam is reified.
The condemnation discourse also places Muslims into a position where they are 
speaking to jihadist terrorists and non-Muslims simultaneously, having to communicate 
to both that violence and its perpetrators are un-Islamic. They “condemn this evil & 
barbaric act” and “extend [their] deepest condolences” to the victims. It is impossible to 
know if their message is heard, but it is re-tweeted, with a range of Muslim condemnation 
tweets being shared and commented on by other users. While Abdel-Fattah (2017) argues 
that these efforts to condemn terrorism can be interpreted as internalised Islamophobia, 
the “Muslim condemnation” tweets also indicate Muslims’ agency to respond to and 
deconstruct discourses about their religion and community.
Notably, this diverges from Aguilera-Carnerero and Azeez’s (2016) finding that most 
people commenting on jihad online are non-Muslims and calls for more research into 
mobilisation of social media to renegotiate (in)security by Muslims in the context of jihadist 
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violence. Using identifiers such as “we” and declaring “I’m a Muslim too”, ostensibly Muslim 
users seek to represent their faith towards the outside and position themselves with the 
grieving public rather than the Muslim attacker. Not aiming to deny internal differences, the 
shared identifier “Muslim” is leveraged to construct Muslim belonging, indicating how it can 
be employed strategically for collective claims-making and political articulation (Adamson 
2011; Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002). The hashtag #WeStandTogether, used in 26% of 
the “Muslim condemnation” tweets, underlines this further.
Using Manchester to critique “politically correctness”
7% of the tweets are critical commentary on the defence of Muslims and Islam 
described above (see Figure 7). Often overlapping with anti-Muslim narratives, these 
posts decry that the left and “liberals” are supposedly preoccupied with Islamophobia 
and “Muslims’ feelings” rather than worried about the real issue, “Islamic terrorism”. Like 
the “Muslim response” theme, this discourse highlights the contested nature of post- 
attack reactions. It underlines the significance of studying not only constructions of 
what terrorism is but how lay responses to it are discursively governed. Notably, in this 
discourse, users are less concerned with elite responses or policy, their criticism primar-
ily focuses on other Twitter users.
Figure 6. Tweet with an example of Muslims condemning the attack.
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Underlying this is a stance critical of both Muslims and a “liberal”, politically correct 
culture that is supposedly more concerned with minority rights than the lives lost in the 
attack. Echoing state of emergency logic, some users indicate a willingness to sacrifice 
civil liberties and minority rights in order to appropriately, read forcefully, respond to the 
attack. What is constructed as empathy and solidarity in the “Muslim defence” discourse is 
here understood as competitive victimisation and politicisation of the tragedy – never 
mind the inherently politicised nature of the “anti-liberal response” discourse itself. 
Indeed, many of the tweets reference the attack’s immediate victims as those who people 
should actually be concerned about. Users emphasise that “children” died and that the 
“BLOOD ON THE BODIES IN MANCHESTER” had not even dried before people pivoted their 
attention to Islamophobia. Understanding terrorism, thus, transcends the immediate 
circumstances of an attack; it includes the myriad of ways such an attack is interpreted 
and integrated into existing political discourses. Whether that is one that is concerned 
with minority rights and hate speech, or one that is opposed to supposed political 
correctness.
Constructing Manchester through victimhood
Although rarely a focal point of CTS, victimhood is not neutral (McGowan 2016). 6% of the 
tweets give insight into which attributes of the bombing’s victims are assigned post-facto 
meaning and how they contribute to the interpretation of the attack. In the sample, 
victimhood is gendered and aged, with users highlighting that many of the concert 
attendees were young women and girls, given the demographics of Ariana Grande’s 
Figure 7. Tweet decrying “liberal’s” response to the attack.
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fanbase. They are ideal victims (on this, see Lawther 2014; Christie 1986): “innocent little 
girls”, “literal children.” Their suffering is evoked to underline the barbarity of the attack 
and, often, that of its Muslim perpetrator. The focus on victims’ gendered and age- 
associated innocence and fragility converges with Jarvis and Lister (2016) and Jackson 
and Hall’s (2016) findings that vernacular understandings of terrorism, similar to those 
found in elite discourse, generally define it as the killing of “innocent” civilians. However, 
in line with McGowan (2016), who such a victim is and how far both innocence and 
victimisation extend is subjective and contested.
Tellingly, there is a second discourse about the victims of terrorism present in the data: 
one about non-white and Muslim victims. Some users argue that Muslims were also 
present at the concert and were equally impacted by the attack. A few posters make 
more general statements criticising perceived worthy/unworthy victim differentiation 
(Camarillo 2018), with one tweet stating that “Muslims and Muslim countries get bombed, 
no one ask[s].” Conceptualising Muslims as (fellow) victims can be read as a de-securitising 
move, however, it maintains an essentialising victim-perpetrator binary. In this discourse, 
the victimisation of Muslims is what allows them to avoid suspicion; mirroring the “defence 
of Muslims” and “Muslim condemnation” themes, Muslims cannot be neutral bystanders.
Conclusions on terrorism and vernacular security in the aftermath of the 
Manchester bombing
The study finds that Twitter provides a platform for a plethora of competing, contra-
dicting, and self-aware vernacular discourses on terrorism in the aftermath of terrorist 
violence. This is likely to be a generalisable conclusion, with some important caveats. First, 
social media platforms are ever-evolving; their shifts in terms of popularity and their 
variation in output formats will dictate how and where constructions about terrorism 
occur in the future. Twitter, while likely to remain important, is only one in an increasingly 
diverse social media ecosystem, and future studies should consider how other platforms 
offer insights into terrorism constructions. Second, this article has demonstrated the 
unpredictability of the discursive landscape around terrorism. While some of the tweets 
demonstrate the salience of marginalising discourses, users also defended Muslims and 
attempted to nuance their position in British society. This paradoxical and dynamic 
discursive repertoire is likely to be a persistent feature of bottom-up, user-generated 
content about terrorism. It suggests that lay social media audiences are not only increas-
ingly literate in post-attack discourses on “Muslim terrorism” but are confident enough to 
deploy their own narratives within the discursive landscape. Further research might seek 
to compare such discourses found on social media with those uttered “from above” in 
response to the same event.
Like Jarvis and Lister (2016), we did not encounter disengaged nor silenced security 
audiences (cf. Roe 2012). Rather than the passive receptors of security speak, awaiting its 
interpretation by security elites, we found laypeople who speak security themselves and 
even pre-empt common tropes on terrorism, seeking to engage with, manipulate, and 
critique them. This affords discursive agency both to the lay audiences and the Muslim 
subjects of security – agency for which traditional “accounts of security discourse have left 
depressingly little room” (Pears 2016, 80). Social media, with its decentralised and net-
worked structure of influential speech, therefore, presents a fundamental challenge to 
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theorisations of security and securitisation that presumes the audience as passive, and 
underlines the importance of the vernacular turn. Especially in the direct aftermath of an 
attack, when expert analyses are still being conducted, political speeches written, and 
media reports put together, Twitter offers a view into immediate lay responses and 
emergent discourses. Indeed, our findings suggest an audience that, on Twitter, is hardly 
only audience but seeks to speak security itself and challenge securitisation. The “Muslim 
response” tweets, additionally, indicate that social media may serve as a site for securi-
tised groups to contest their portrayal (also see Bahfen 2018).
Furthermore, our findings challenge the conclusion that social media, such as Twitter, 
functions as mere amplifier of anti-Muslim narratives spread by traditional media and add 
nuance to scholarship that primarily focuses on the internet as a place for sharing 
Islamophobic messages. Many users in our dataset move beyond securitising Muslims or 
Islam and construct them as banal or even a force for good instead. The religious and political 
meaning of “Muslims” and “Islam” themselves is subject to ambiguous and competing 
interpretations. Being attentive to such re-constructions and deconstructions of common 
discourses about Muslims and terrorism heeds Jarvis’s (2019, 120) call for vernacular security 
studies that are “responsive to precisely these [experienced and lived] understandings and 
imaginaries rather than having potential threats or fears mapped out in advance”. However, 
continuing links between terrorism, Islam, and Muslims even in the “Muslim defence” dis-
course also illustrate that even when securitising speech acts are criticised or deconstructed, 
the underlying logic established by them can endure. These insights render social media an 
ever more important arena for both the study of vernacular security but also for critical 
terrorism scholars who seek to understand the variety of ways that contemporary terror 
events are constructed “from below”.
Notes
1. Hours after the detonation, American media identified Abedi as the suspected perpetrator 
and journalists began to construct a narrative about him in the following days (inter alia 
Evans et al. 2017). Meanwhile, Theresa May gave an official statement at Downing Street over 
12 hours after the attack (Walker and Elgot 2017) and the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, 
after expert deliberation, raised the national threat level from severe to critical the evening of 
the 23rd (MI5 2017).
2. Insufficient conceptualisation of the “audience” has also drawn criticism from within the 
securitisation framework (Jarvis and Legrand 2017; Léonard and Kaunert 2010; also see 
Huysmans 2011, on security beyond the exceptional).
3. Given the location of the attack, we focus on studies conducted in the UK, but similar 
observations regarding securitisation and Islamophobia have been made in other contexts 
(inter alia Eroukhmanoff 2019b; Cesari 2009; Cherney and Murphy 2016).
4. While other studies on Twitter delineate their sample with the help of hashtags (e.g. Eriksson 
2016; Merrill et al. 2020), we searched beyond hashtags to include a wider range of posts and 
in recognition that neither #Muslims nor #Manchester are sufficiently established and specific 
to warrant a more targeted search.
5. Crenshaw, notably, did not control for attackers’ faith.
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Appendix Individual network graphs (anonymised)
Figure A1. Network graph created by engagement with the most central influential user’s content, 
who criticised those “blaming muslims [sic]” and emphasised Muslims’ positive contributions in the 
wake of the attack.
Figure A2. Network graph created by engagement with the second most central user’s content; a user 
whose other posts and username focuses on the pop band One Direction and who asked people not 
to blame Muslims, declaring that “terrorism has no religion”. Like the users at the centre of Figures 1, 3, 
and 4, the poster themselves does not appear as an influential actor, but their content is highly 
engaged with, illustrating how an influencer in a terror debate on Twitter may rise from obscurity and 
return to this post-event.
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Figure A3. Network graph created by engagement with the third most central influential user’s 
content who highlighted hat “terrorism has no religion” in their initial tweet.
Figure A4. Network graph created by engagement with the fourth most central influential user’s content – 
a highly critical “message to those abusing Muslims” posted by a Manchester United fan account.
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